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BILLINGS, Judge:
The appellant, Gregory J. Marshall (MMr. Marshall"), was
charged with possession of a controlled substance with the intent
to distribute for value, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1989). Mr. Marshall filed a pretrial
motion to suppress the 140 pounds of marijuana seized from the
rental car he was driving when he was arrested. The trial court
denied Mr. Marshall's motion and he filed this interlocutory
appeal. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
We recite the facts surrounding the seizure of the contraband
in detail as the legal issues presented are fact sensitive.
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Utah
Highway Patrol Trooper Denis Avery ("Trooper Avery M ) was driving
*This opinion issued on Petition for Rehearing replaces the
opinion of the same name issued on December 26, 1989.

on Interstate 70 near Salina, Utah. He noticed Mr. Marshall's
vehicle in the left-hand lane passing a motor home. Trooper
Avery observed that Mr. Marshall's turn signal remained blinking
for approximately two miles after he passed the motor home. Not
knowing whether Mr. Marshall's signal was malfunctioning or
whether Mr. Marshall had negligently left the signal on, Trooper
Avery pulled the vehicle over to inform Mr. Marshall of the
problem and to give him a warning ticket. Trooper Avery had
issued similar warning citations for turn signal violations
approximately five to ten times in the previous six-month period.
Prior to stopping Mr. Marshall/ Trooper Avery noticed the
vehicle had California license plates. He approached Mr.
Marshall's vehicle and informed Mr. Marshall of the turn signal
problem. Mr. Marshall responded that he had been having Ma hard
time keeping the thing turned off."
Trooper Avery asked Mr. Marshall for his driver's license and
vehicle registration. Mr. Marshall produced a New York driver's
license and a California rental agreement for the vehicle. Mr.
Marshall said he was going skiing in Denver and planned to return
the car to San Diego, California. However, the rental agreement
indicated that the car would be returned in New York in five days.
Trooper Avery acknowledged he became suspicious that Mr.
Marshall might be transporting drugs. Trooper Avery asked Mr.
Marshall to return with him to his patrol car where he issued a
warning citation for "Lights, head, tail, other." Trooper Avery
then returned Mr. Marshall's driver's license and the rental
agreement.
Trooper Avery next asked Mr. Marshall if he was carrying
alcohol, drugs or firearms. Mr. Marshall stated he was not.
Trooper Avery then asked Mr. Marshall if he could "look inside
the vehicle." Mr. Marshall responded, "Go ahead," Trooper Avery
and Mr. Marshall walked back to Mr. Marshall's vehicle. The
passenger door was locked and Mr. Marshall reached in on the
driver's side to open the door. Trooper Avery noticed a small
red bag on the floor of the vehicle and asked if he could open
it. Mr. Marshall agreed. No contraband was found inside the bag
or the passenger compartment of the vehicle.
Trooper Avery then asked if Mr. Marshall had a key to the
trunk and if Mr. Marshall would open the trunk. Mr. Marshall
attempted to open the trunk, but was shaking so badly that
Trooper Avery had to assist him by holding the key latch cover up
while Mr. Marshall inserted the key. Trooper Avery saw four
padlocked suitcases when Mr. Marshall opened the trunk. Trooper

9

Avery asked Mr. Marshall what the suitcases contained and Mr.
Marshall responded ••clothes." Trooper Avery then asked if he
could look in the suitcases. Mr. Marshall immediately reversed
his statement and responded that the suitcases were not his and
must have already been in the trunk when he rented the vehicle.
Trooper Avery testified there was some play in the zipper of one
bag and he unzipped it far enough to see a green leafy
substance. Trooper Avery then arrested Mr. Marshall for
possession of a controlled substance.
Mr. Marshall did not testify or present any evidence to
contradict Trooper Avery's testimony during the hearing below.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
M

[W]e will not disturb the trial court's factual evaluation
underlying its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress
unless it is clearly erroneous." State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972,
974 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). See also State v. Walker, 743 P.2d
191, 193 (Utah 1987); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989). Further, H[t]he trial court's finding is clearly
erroneous only if it is against the clear weight of the evidence
or if [the appellate court] reach[es] a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. Sery, 758
P.2d 935, 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(c) requires the trial
court to state its findings on the record "[w]here factual issues
are involved in determining a motion." Those findings must be
sufficiently detailed in order to allow us the opportunity to
adequately review the decision below.1
1. Utah appellate courts have consistently required detailed
findings of fact to support a judgment entered by a trial judge
in civil cases. Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah
1979) ("The importance of complete, accurate and consistent
findings of fact in a case tried by a judge is essential to the
resolution of dispute under the proper rule of law. To that end
the findings should be sufficiently detailed and include enough
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusion on each factual issue was reached."); Sampson v.
Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002-03 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (findings of
fact must indicate the "mind of the court." (quoting Parks v.
Zions First Nat'l Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 601 (Utah 1983)).
Detailed findings of fact likewise greatly ease the burden of
an appellate court in its review of a trial court's decision on a
motion to suppress. This is particularly true where multiple
issue are presented in the motion to suppress. 4 W. LaFave,

PRETEXT STOP
Initially, Mr. Marshall contends Trooper Avery used the fact
that his turn signal was malfunctioning as a pretext to stop his
vehicle to search for evidence of drug trafficking.
The protective shield of the fourth amendment applies when an
officer stops an automobile on the highway and detains its
occupants. State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah Ct. App.
1988). A police officer may constitutionally stop a citizen on
two alternative grounds. First, the stop "could be based on
specific, articulable facts which, together with rational
inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable person
to conclude [defendant] had committed or was about to commit a
crime." Jjl. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State
v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984); State v. Truiillo,
739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). Second, the police
officer can "stop an automobile for a traffic violation committed
in the officer's presence." Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977. However,
an officer may not use a traffic violation stop as a pretext to
search for evidence of a more serious crime. Id.
To determine if Trooper Avery stopped Mr. Marshall's vehicle
to investigate his hunch that Mr. Marshall's vehicle was involved
in drug trafficking, we determine whether a hypothetical
reasonable officer, in view of the totality of the circumstances
confronting him or her, would have stopped Mr. Marshall to issue
a warning for failing to terminate a turn signal. III. at 978.
Mr. Marshall claims Trooper Avery's stop of his vehicle is
similar to the stop we found unconstitutional in Sierra. We
disagree. In Sierra, the basis articulated for the stop was that
the driver remained in the left lane too long after passing a
car. In this case, Trooper Avery perceived an equipment problem
with Mr. Marshall's car. Either his turn signal was
(Footnote 1 continued)
Search & Seizure § 11.2, at 252 (1987) [hereinafter wLaFaveM]
(citing State v. Johnson, 16 Or. App. 560, 519 P,2d 1053, 1058-59
(1974)). Many jurisdictions require specific findings of fact on
all motions to suppress. See LaFave at § 11.2 n.188. We believe
the requirement a sound one.

malfunctioning or he had negligently failed to turn it off.2
Courts consistently have held that a police officer can stop a
vehicle when he or she believes the vehicle's safety equipment is
not functioning properly,3
Furthermore, unlike the officer in Sierra, Trooper Avery was
not suspicious of Mr, Marshall for other reasons before the stop,
had not followed him in order to find some reason to pull him
over, and, before the alleged violation occurred, had not radioed
for help thereby indicating he intended to stop the vehicle.

2. While the warning citation does not specify which provision
of the Utah Code Mr. Marshall violated, the state asserts that
his conduct was in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-117(1)
(1988) which, with our emphasis, provides:!
It is a misdemeanor for any person to
drive or move or for the owner to cause or
knowingly permit to be driven or moved on
any highway any vehicle or combination of
vehicles which is in such unsafe condition
as to endanger any person, or which does
not contain those parts or is not at all
times equipped with lamps and other
equipment in proper condition gnfl
adjustment . . . .

3. In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 660-61 (1979), the
United States Supreme Court stated that an officer has a duty in
the interest of highway safety to stop vehicles for safety
reasons. "Many violations of minimum vehicle-safety requirements
are observable, and something can be done about them by the
observing officer, directly and immediately.- l£i. at 660. The
Court inferred that as long as an officer suspects the driver is
violating "any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and
equipment regulations,- the police officer may legally stop the
vehicle. Id. at 661. See Townsel v. State, 763 P.2d 1353, 1355
(Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (court held stop justified when vehicle's
headlight was out, a tail light was broken, the license plate and
windows were obscured, and speeding); State v. Puia, 112 Ariz.
519, 544 P.2d 201, 202 (1975) (suspicion of defective turn
signals justified stop); State v. Fuller, 556 A.2d 224, 224 (Me.
1989) (stop justified when blinking headlights led officer to
stop vehicle for safety reasons).

In conclusion, we find Trooper Avery's stop of Mr. Marshall's
vehicle was not a pretext, but was a valid exercise of police
authority to make certain Mr. Marshall's vehicle was functioning
properly.
UNREASONABLE DETENTION
Next, Mr. Marshall complains that the extent of his detention
and the scope of Trooper Avery's investigation exceeded
constitutional limits.4
"[I]n determining whether the seizure and search were
•unreasonable' our inquiry is a dual one—whether the officer's
action was justified at its inception, and whether it was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
19-20 (1968).
We have previously found that Trooper Avery's traffic stop of
Mr. Marshall was justified. The remaining question is whether
Trooper Avery's subsequent detention and questioning of Mr.
Marshall was reasonably related to the initial traffic stop or
was justified because Trooper Avery had a reasonable suspicion to
believe Mr. Marshall was engaged in a more serious crime. United
States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 1988).
The United States Supreme Court has not chosen to define a
bright-line rule as to the acceptable length of a detention
because "common sense and ordinary human experience must govern
over rigid criteria." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685
(1985). The Court has chosen to focus, not on the length of the
detention alone, but on "whether the police diligently pursued a
means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain
the defendant." id. at 686.
Trooper Avery wrote out the warning citation within ten
minutes of stopping Mr. Marshall and then returned Mr. Marshall's
driver's license and the vehicle rental agreement. Trooper Avery
claims that as a result of his examination of Mr. Marshall's

4. We do not analyze this issue under article I, section 14 of
the Utah Constitution as the state constitutional issue was not
sufficiently particularized below nor is a reasoned analysis
provided on appeal as to why our analysis should be different
under Utah's constitution. See State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326,
327-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

driver's license and the vehicle rental agreement and his brief
conversation with Mr. Marshall, he became suspicious that Mr.
Marshall was involved in drug trafficking. Specifically, Trooper
Avery points to the fact that Mr. Marshall produced a New York
driver's license and a California rental agreement for the
vehicle. When questioned about the rental agreement, Mr.
Marshall said he was going skiing in Colorado and planned to
return the car to San Diego, California. However, the rental
agreement indicated the car was to be returned to New York in
five days, the approximate time it takes to drive directly from
California to New York. In addition, Mr. Marshall was driving
along a well-known drug trafficking route.
As a result of his suspicion, Trooper Avery then asked Mr.
Marshall if he was carrying weapons, alcohol, or drugs in the
vehicle. Mr. Marshall responded he was not. Then Trooper Avery
allegedly asked for permission to look into the vehicle and
received Mr. Marshall's consent.
The trial judge found that Trooper Avery's "investigation was
reasonable in view of the defendant's statements in regards to
the vehicle ownership and the driver's usage. The destination
itinerary would have put a reasonable officer on notice that
something was wrong." Although not directly so stating, the
judge, in substance, concluded that Trooper Avery had reasonable
suspicion to believe that Mr. Marshall was involved in illegal
conduct. Although it is a close call, we agree with the trial
court's assessment of the reasonableness of the detention.
We find that Trooper Avery's questioning of Mr. Marshall as
to conduct unrelated to the traffic stop was justified because he
had reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. Marshall was engaged in a
more serious crime. See Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1519.
In conclusion, based on the totality of the circumstances, we
agree with the trial court that Trooper Avery's ten-minute
detention and brief questioning of Mr. Marshall prior to Mr.
Marshall's alleged consent to search the vehicle was not an
unreasonable detention.
SEARCH
On appeal, Mr. Marshall argues that even if his initial stop
and subsequent detention were not constitutionally deficient, the
subsequent search of the trunk of the vehicle and the suitcases
found in the trunk without a warrant violated his fourth
amendment rights. The state contends, on the other hand, that
Mr. Marshall consented to the search of the trunk and abandoned
any privacy interest in the suitcases and thus Trooper Avery's

search of the suitcases was constitutionally permissible.5 In
our prior opinion, we focused solely on whether the search of the
suitcases was proper. We found the warrantless search of the
suitcases unconstitutional as we refused to allow the state to
raise the issue of fourth amendment standing for the first time
on appeal. We granted the state's petition for rehearing to
re-examine the related fourth amendment issues of voluntary
consent and abandonment which are central to a resolution of this
appeal.
1.

Stenfling

The state, in its original brief on appeal, claimed Mr.
Marshall was without standing to challenge the seizure of the
suitcases as he had disclaimed any ownership or possessory
interest in the suitcases during the search and thus had no
expectation of privacy in their contents. See Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 138-50 (1978); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334, 1335
(Utah 1984); State v. Grueber, 776 P.2d 70, 73-75 (Utah Ct. App.
1989); State v. DeAlo, 748 P„2d 194, 196-97 (Utah Ct. App.
1987). The state relies upon the following testimony from the
preliminary hearing:
Q.

[Defense Counsel]

And what was inside the trunk?

A.

[Trooper Avery]

Q.

Did you ask if you could look in those suitcases?

A.

Uh huh (affirmative). First of all, I asked him what
was in the suitcases, and he told me, right quickly,
clothes. Then when I looked at him again, he told me
that he didn't know where they came from, they must have
been in there when he rented the car.

There were four suitcases.

5. The state does not argue that Trooper Avery had probable
cause to search either the car or the suitcases. We, therefore,
need not deal with the troublesome issue of whether probable
cause to search an automobile is sufficient under the automobile
exception to search a locked suitcase found in the trunk of a
car. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (if
probable cause exists, police can search closed containers found
in vehicle); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979)
(warrantless search of a suitcase found in the trunk of a taxi
invalid); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)
(warrantless search of a footlocker found in the trunk of a
vehicle invalid); State v. Hvah, 711 P.2d 264, 272 n.l (Utah
1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring separately) (criticizing the
Ross holding).
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In our prior opinion, we relied on the Utah Supreme Court
decision of State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), which
squarely held that standing to challenge the validity of a search
under the fourth amendment "is not a jurisdictional doctrine
[but] is a substantive doctrine that identifies those who may
assert rights against unlawful searches and seizures." !<£. at
1138. Citing the general rule that a substantive issue or -claim
of error cannot be raised for the first time on appeal," the
supreme court deemed the issue of standing waived. Id,, at
1138-39.
The state attempts to distinguish Schlosser, claiming that in
that case the state not only failed to raise the issue of
standing in the motion to suppress hearing, but also on appeal
and that here, unlike Schlosser, the state raises standing simply
as an alternative ground to uphold the trial court's denial of
the motion to suppress.6 We do not find the distinction
determinative.7
6. Prior to Schlosser, the Utah Supreme Court had, in several
cases, considered standing for the first time on appeal and had
utilized the doctrine to refuse to consider the constitutional
validity of a challenged search. See, e.g., State v.
Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 126-27 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) (court
did not address whether the issue of standing had been raised
below, but stated that defendant could not assert any expectation
of privacy in vehicle because he did not own vehicle and had
presented no testimony that he had permission of owner or had
borrowed vehicle "under circumstances that would imply permissive
use"); State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375, 1377-78 (Utah 1986) (State
below argued there was consent by defendant's ex-wife to search
his mother's trailer. On appeal, the state argued defendant had
no possessory or proprietary interest in the trailer and thus had
no expectation of privacy. The court declined to reach the issue
of consent because it found that defendant lacked standing to
object to the search because the stipulated evidence did not show
that defendant shared ownership, use or possession of the
trailer.); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334, 1335 (Utah 1984) (At
trial, the defendant produced evidence that neither the attache
case in which the evidence was found nor the vehicle belonged to
the defendant. The court did not address whether the issue of
standing was raised below, but declined to reach the guestion of
the validity of the search because the defendant conceded he did
not own the case or the vehicle and had failed to show any
expectation of privacy.). In these earlier cases, it is
sometimes unclear whether the Utah Supreme Court raised the issue
of standing sua sponte on appeal or permitted the state to raise
the issue of standing for the first time on appeal. We assume
that Schlosser supercedes these earlier cases and thus do not
follow them.
7. Although the Utah Supreme Court refused to allow standing to
be utilized to attack the trial court's granting of a motion to

The United States Supreme Court took the same position in
Steaaald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), when it refused
to allow the government to raise the issue of fourth amendment
standing for the first time on appeal to provide an alternative
ground to sustain the trial court's refusal to grant a motion to
suppress. The Court concluded:
Aside from arguing that a search warrant
was not constitutionally required/ the
Government was initially entitled to
defend against petitioner's charge of an
unlawful search by asserting that
petitioner lacked a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the searched home# or that
he consented to the search, or that
exigent circumstances justified the
entry. The Government, however, mav lose
its right to raise factual issues of this
sort before this Court when it has made
contrary assertions in the courts below,
when it has acquiesced in contrary
findings by those courts, or when it has
failed to raise such questions in a timely
fashion during the litigation.
Id. at 209 (emphasis added).
The state, on petition for rehearing, contends that language
in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) is contrary to our
conclusion that the state should not be allowed to raise standing
for the first time on appeal. We disagree. The language in
Rakas relied upon by the state is consistent with our view.
The proponent of a motion to suppress has
the burden of establishing that his own
Fourth Amendment rights were violated by
the challenged search or seizure. The

(Footnote 7 continued)
suppress in Schlosser, the court relied on State v. Goodman, 42
Wash. App. 331, 711 P.2d 1057 (1985), which held the state
could not raise the issue of standing for the first time on
appeal to provide an alternative ground for sustaining the
trial court's denial of a motion to suppress. Id., at 1060.
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prosecutor argued that petitioners lacked
standing to challenge the search because
they did not own the rifle, the shells or
the automobile* Petitioners did not
contest the factual predicates of the
prosecutor's argument and instead, simply
stated that thev were not reguired to
prove ownership to object to the search.
The prosecutor's argument gave petitioners
notice that they were to be put to their
proof on any issue as to which they had
the burden, and because of their failure
to assert ownership, we must assume, for
purposes of our review, that petitioners
do not own the rifle or the shells.
Id, at 130 n.l (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
We agree with the state and Rakas that Mr. Marshall has
the ultimate burden of proof to establish that his fourth
amendment rights were violated or, to put it otherwise, that
he had an expectation of privacy in the area searched or the
articles seized.8 Nevertheless, warrantless searches are
per se unreasonable and the burden is on the state, in the
first instance, to show that a warrantless search is lawful.
State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984).
We believe Rakas is consistent with our view that the
prosecutor, as part of the state's burden to establish the
constitutionality of a warrantless search, must give a
defendant "notice that he will be put to his proof on the
issue of fourth amendment standing. This can be done at any
time during the hearing on a defendant's motion to suppress as
long as the defendant has an opportunity to put on evidence to

8. However, the failure of the state to challenge Mr.
Marshall's standing at the suppression hearing did not give
Mr. Marshall an opportunity to assert his expectation of
privacy. ££e Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224, 227-28
(1972) (per curiam) (Where petitioner's failure to assert an
expectation of privacy may have been explained by the
Government's failure to challenge standing either at the
suppression hearing or at trial, the United States Supreme
Court remanded to the district court for further proceedings
to allow petitioner to establish a privacy interest.).

meet the claim.9 Once the defendant has been put on notice
that the state claims the warrantless search was
constitutional because he has no expectation of privacy in the
area searched, then the defendant must factually demonstrate
that he does have standing to contest the warrantless search.
We believe the Schlosser standing rule was fashioned to
protect the defendant from being required to deal with new
legal issues on appeal when he had no warning of the necessity
to develop the relevant facts below.
2.

Consent/Abandonment

The state, on petition for rehearing, excuses its failure
to raise the issue of standing claiming that neither Mr.
Marshall, the state nor the trial judge focused on the search
of the suitcases in the motion to suppress hearing. Rather,
the state claims the hearing centered on the pretextual nature
of the stop, the unreasonable detention of Mr. Marshall and
the unlawful search of the trunk.
Mr. Marshall, on petition for rehearing, claims the
following comment made by defense counsel sufficiently focused
the proceeding on the search of the suitcases: "Additionally
there is no evidence that there was consent to search the
bags."
Upon a re-examination of the record, we agree with the
state that the parties and the trial judge did not focus on
the critical issue of the search of the suitcases at the
motion to suppress hearing. The result is that the trial
judge did not make adequate findings of fact on the issues of
voluntary consent to search the trunk or the suitcases and Mr.
Marshall's alleged abandonment of any privacy interest in the
suitcases, which the parties now agree are pivotal on appeal.
We therefore remand for a rehearing on these critical issues.

9. The defendant's testimony at the motion to suppress
hearing cannot be used against the defendant at trial. See
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (prosecutor
cannot use a defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing as
substantive evidence of guilt at trial unless defendant makes
no objection). We note, however, that the United States
Supreme Court had not decided whether the Simmons rule
precludes the use of a defendant's suppression hearing
testimony to impeach the defendant's testimony at trial. See
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 94 & n.9 (1980).

890121-CA
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We nevertheless discuss the controlling law to guide the trial
court on rehearing.
A search is valid under the fourth amendment if it is
conducted as a result of the defendant's voluntary consent.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218# 219 (1973); State v.
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). "[T]he
question [of] whether a consent to a search was in fact
•voluntary' or was the product of duress or coercion, express
or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the
totality of all the circumstances." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at
227. HA trial court's finding of voluntary consent will not
be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous." United States v.
Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1130 (1st Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 440
U.S. 958 (1979).
In United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1977),
the Tenth Circuit outlined the specifics necessary for the
government to sustain its burden to show that voluntary consent
was given:
(1) There must be clear and positive
testimony that the consent was
"unequivocal and specific" and "freely and
intelligently given"; (2) the government
must prove consent was given without
duress or coercion, express or implied;
and (3) the courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against the waiver
of fundamental constitutional rights and
there must be convincing evidence that
such rights were waived.
Id. at 885 (quoting Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680, 684
(10th Cir. 1962)). See also United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d
1448, 1453 (10th Cir. 1985). See generally State v. Whittenback,
621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980); State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972,
980-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Even when a defendant voluntarily consents to a search, the
ensuing search must be limited in scope to only the specific area
agreed to by defendant. "The scope of a consent search is
limited by the breadth of the actual consent itself. . . . Any
police activity that transcends the actual scope of the consent
given encroaches on the Fourth Amendment rights of the suspect."
United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 377 (10th Cir. 1985); see,
e.g., People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 201 (Colo. 1984) (scope of

consent exceeded when police asked to "look around" the house,
then conducted a 45-minute search of rooms, drawers, boxes and
closed containers).
The trial court made the following conclusory finding on the
issue of Mr. Marshall's consent: "The Defendant consented to the
search. There was no evidence of duress or coercion." This
conclusory finding on consent is not particularly helpful in
determining whether Mr. Marshall's consent was "unequivocal and
specific" as it does not detail what Mr. Marshall agreed could be
searched—the interior of the passenger compartment, the trunk,
or the locked suitcases.10 Furthermore, the relevant portions
from the transcript of Trooper Avery's testimony are troubling:
Q.

[Defense Counsel] What were the words he [sic] used
when you asked him to search his vehicle?

A.

[Trooper Avery] I asked Mr. Marshall if—if there were
any—if there was any—were there any drugs in the
vehicle, and he took two or three seconds—no, wait a
minute, I guess—I first asked him if he was carrying
any weapons and he told me no. I then asked him if he
was carrying any—if there was any alcohol in the
vehicle, he said that he did not drink. I recall both
answers were quite quick. And then I asked him if there
were any drugs in the vehicle, he paused for, you know,
probably two or three seconds, and then told me no. I
then asked him if it would be okay if I looked in the
vehicle, search the vehicle, and he said go ahead.

Q.

Now, did you ask if you could look in the vehicle, or
did you ask if you could search the vehicle?

A.

Well, according to this [his report], I said—I asked if
I could look in the vehicle.

Q.

So, it was "look in the vehicle"?
You didn't ask if you could open anything inside the
vehicle or anything else, did you?

10. See supra note 1 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the importance of detailed findings on a motion to suppress.
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A.

No.

I just asked if I could look in the vehicle.

Q.

And what happened then?

A.

Mr. Marshall just told me, you know, he said go right
ahead. He got out/ gathered up his papers and we walked
up to the front of the vehicle, and he had to open the
passenger door, as I recall.

Q.

And how did you get in the trunk?

A.

I asked him, I said—asked him if he had the key to the
trunk and he says yes, and I says—and I asked him if
he'[d] open it, which he did, he tried. He was
extremely nervous at the time. Ii—

Q.

So did you open the trunk?

A.

No, sir, I did not. He—he could not—there was a
little latch over the key hole. He was shaking so hard,
he couldn't even hold the latch open, so I held the
latch up for him so he could insert the key.

Without the assistance of specific findings of fact, we
cannot resolve the difficult issue of whether Mr. Marshall's
opening the trunk constituted implied consent to search the trunk
under the totality of the circumstances presented. See United
States v. Almand, 565 F.2d 927, 930 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 439
U.S. 824 (1978) (voluntary consent found where defendant silently
reached into his pocket, removed key, then unlocked and opened
camper door).
Furthermore, the record creates a substantial question as to
whether the court's general finding that there was "no evidence
of duress or coercion" was intended to apply to the search of the
trunk or, even if it was, whether the finding is consistent with
the standard required for a voluntary consent. See United States
v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1977); State v. Sierra, 754
P.2d 972, 980-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Likewise, the court in
its findings fails to focus on the search of the locked suitcases
and the issues of voluntary consent or abandonment.
Even if we were to accept the state's argument that the
undisputed facts support a finding that Mr. Marshall

abandoned11 any expectation of privacy in the suitcases by his
ambiguous disclaimer of ownership and that the state should be
allowed to raise this fourth amendment standing issue for the
first time on appeal, we would be unable to dispose of this case
on the record before us. The state, in its petition for
rehearing, correctly points out that "a loss of standing to
challenge a search cannot be brought about by illegal police
conduct." United States v. Labat, 696 F. Supp. 1419, 1425 (D.
Kan. 1988).
Thus, we would have to determine if the search of the trunk
was illegal or was a result of a voluntary consent. This we
cannot do on the record before us.
Even if we determined the search of the trunk was unlawful,
the "defendant must show a nexus between the allegedly unlawful
police conduct and the abandonment of the property." 2&. at
1426. See, e.g., United States v. Tolbert, 692 F«2d 1041 (6th
Cir. 1982), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (While "an
unconstitutional seizure or arrest which prompts a disclaimer of
property vitiates that act," 14. at 1045, the court found the
defendant's disclaimer was not precipitated by improper conduct.
Id. at 1048.); United States v. Gilman, 684 F.2d 616, 620 (9th
Cir. 1982) ("There must be a nexus between the allegedly unlawful
police conduct and abandonment of property if the challenged

11. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1173 (10th
Cir. 1983) (Court found abandonment when police initially saw
defendant running with a brown satchel, however, when they
captured defendant, he did not have the satchel and disavowed
knowledge of it. Police later found the satchel outside the
building and searched it.); United States v. Kendall, 655 F.2d
199, 202 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982)
(court found abandonment where the defendant, after picking up
the luggage at the claim area, produced a mismatched baggage
claim check, told agents that his name was not on the luggage
name tag, and allowed the agents to return the luggage to the
claim area, thus giving the agents the impression that he had no
interest in the luggage); United States v. Veatch, 674 F.2d 1217,
1220-21 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 456 U.S. 946 (1982) (court
found abandonment where the defendant disclaimed ownership of a
wallet found on the seat of the vehicle); United States v.
Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (court found
abandonment when defendants disclaimed ownership of suitcases and
began to walk away from them).

evidence is to be suppressed."); United States v. Beck, 602 F.2d
726, 730 (5th Cir. 1979) (if there is a nexus between unlawful
police conduct and the discovery of evidence, the court should
suppress the evidence). See generally Search and Seizure: What
Constitutes Abandonment of Personal Property within Rule that
Search and Seizure of Abandoned Property Is Not
Unreasonable—Modern Cases, 40 A.L.R.4th 381 (1985). Again,
there is no finding on this crucial issue.
Therefore, we reverse and remand this interlocutory appeal
for a rehearing on Mr. Marshall's motion to suppress on the
limited issues of whether Mr. Marshall voluntarily consented to
the search of the trunk or the suitcases, whether Mr. Marshall
abandoned any privacy interest in the suitcases and thus lacks
standing to challenge their search, and finally, if the trial
court finds there was an illegal search of the trunk or
suitcases, whether there is a sufficient nexus between that
illegal search and Mr. Marshall's abandonment, if any, of his
expectation of privacy in the suitcases.

Judith M. Billings, Judge

Nornran H. JacksonX/uudge

